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STUDENT NOTES 225
There are no cases in which a distinction has been made between a
general practicioner practicing in the poor sections of a city and a
practicioner practicing in the wealthy sections of the same city. The
same reasons for a distinction between the city and the country doctor
apply equally well in support of a distinction between two doctors prac-
ticing in different sections of the same city. As the distinction is made
in one case and not in the other, the American standard sets up an
arbitrary requirement.
If the rule were changed to require the physician to exercise the
degree of care ordinarily exercised by average members of the profes-
sion in good standing practicing under similar circumstances, it would
cease to be an arbitrary one. Stated as above, the rule would maintain
the objective standard of the average physician in good standing and
it would do away with the arbitrary requirement making a distinction
between a city doctor and a country doctor and refusing to make a dis-
tinction between two doctors practicing under different circumstances
in the same city. The locality would simply become one of the circum-
stances and would be taken into consideration along with the type of
equipment and other attendant circumstances of each particular case.
There are two other features of the American standard that should
be mentioned. First a physician is not required to exercise hfs best
skill and care so long as he measures up to the objective standard of
the average physician in good standing.' Secondly, a physician prac-
ticing under a school or branch of medicine other than the allopathic
is held only to exercise the care and skill exercised by the average
members of his particular school." The courts do not go into the
comparative merits of the different schools of medicine. Thus a sani-
practor is not held to exercise the care of an average physician in good
standing but the care of an average sanipractor in good standing.u
RoY VANCE, JR.
TRADE REGULATION: INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT
AND REFUSAL TO DEAL IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONSPIRACY AND MONOPOLY
Early in the English common law there emerged the concept of
liability for inducing breach of contract where the defendant's act was
tortious per se,' for example, where the act itself constituted fraud,
9 Dorris v. Warford, 124 Ky. 768, 100 S. W. 768, 14 Ann. Cases 602
(1907); Wilks v. Black, 188 Mich. 478, 154 N. W. 561 (1915), cited
supra note 1. The physician is not required to possess or exercise the
highest degree of skill known to the profession in order to escape
liability, only such reasonable care as is generally used by physicians
in similar localities. Hales v. Raines, 146 Mo. App. 232, 130 S. W. 425
(1910), cited supra note 1.
nForce v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27 AtL. 1116 (1893) (homeopath);
Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1, 219 Pao. 34 (1923) (sanipractor).
2 1Wilcox v. Carroll, supra note 10.
See Restatement, Torts (vol. IV 1939) at p. 51: "Thus, in 1410, it
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deceit, or threats of bodily harm; 2 but it was not until the compara-
tively recent case of Lumley v. Gye3 in 1853 that inducement of breach
of contract as a separate tort was first recognized. Prior cases holding
that procuring the breach of a common personal service contract
between employer and employee was an actionable wrong' had been
predicated on the force of the Ordinance of Laborers enacted after the
Great Plague, but in the Gye case, the doctrine was extended to cover
the malicious inducement of a breach of contract between the plaintiff
and an opera singer who was under an exclusive agreement for a
designated period. Bowen v. Hall,6 in 1881, dispelled any doubts as to
whether this concept would continue in the English law, by again
applying it to a set of facts embracing an exclusive personal service
contract similar to that of the Gye case, and recent English law has
gone as far as to indicate that the subject matter is immaterial.,
In America there are two lines of decisions dealing with this prob-
lem; one, apparently the most widely followed, adopts the English
view,8 the other refusing to do soY In those jurisdictions which recog-
nize the doctrine, it, in substance, provides that intentional, malicious
interference with the contract rights of the plaintiff will support
recovery in the absence of justification;1 0 and these rights upon which
the action depends may be limited to those of a valid contract which
is enforceable n or they may extend to unenforceable contracts," or
was said that 'if the comers to my market are disturbed or beaten, by
which I lose my toll, I shall have good action of trespass on the case'
(11 H. IV 47, see also 29 E. III 18 (1356)."
2Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567, 79 Eng. Rep. 485 (K. B. 1621);
Tarleton v. McGawley, Peake's 215, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (N. P. 1793).
3 2 Ellis & Blackburn, 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K. B. 1853).
'See 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 142; see note 5 L R. A. (N. S.)
1092; For an historical approach to the Gye ease see Sayre, Inducing
Breach of Contract (1928) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 633, et seq. where it is
said: "thus was born the doctrine that maliciously to procure a breach
of contract constitutes a tort".
523 Edw. III (1349): "If any reaper, mower, or other workman or
servant, of what estate or condition that he be retained in any man's
service, do depart from the said service without reasonable cause or
licence, before the term agreed, he shall have pain of imprisonment.
And that none under the same pain presume to receive or to retain any
such in his service."
' 6 Q. B. D. 333, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 717 (1881).
'Quinn v. Leatham, A. C. 495 (1901); South Wales Miner's Federa-
tion v. Glamorgan Coal Co., A. C. 239 (1905).
8Angle v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1 (1893); Doremus v.
Hennessey, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924 (rehearing denied 54 N. E. 524)
(1898); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907);
Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920); Prafrie
oil & Gas Co. v. Kinney, 79 Okl. 206, 192 Pac. 586 (1920).
9 See Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations (1928)
41 Harv. L. Rev. 728, 768.
"Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923).
-Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 672
et seq. supra n. 4.
"Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82, 23 Am. St. Rep. 30 (1876) (Unen-
forceability due to Statute of Frauds)..
STUDENT NoTEs
again, in certain instances, they may include contract expectanciesP
but they do not embrace contracts contra bones mores.
4 "Malice", as
used in this connection, is a word of art, not being limited to personal
spite, but rather consisting in a "conscious violation of the law, to the
prejudice of another";5 in other terms, "malice" is a wrongful act done
intentionally, without just cause or excuse.1
There seems to be no precise "rule of thumb" by which to determine
justification in a given instance, but the result is normatively reached
by weighing the defendant's own interest in interfering with the plain-
tiff's contract rights"? against the prevailing social interests and public
demand for competition." In Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow
and Co.," in discussing this proposition the court said:
"The good sense of the tribunal which had to decide would
have to analyse the circumstance, and to discover on which side
of the line each case fell."
From this general application of the doctrine, similar conclusions
may be drawn in reference to a "refusal to deal", which is, analytically
speaking, one of the means by which a person may induce another to
commit a breach of his contract with a third person, or to refrain from
entering into or continuing a business realtion with him. The nice
question arising in this class of cases is whether the defendant is merely
exercising his prerogative freedom to select the persons with whom he
will do business, or whether he is actually inducing a third person not
to deal with the plaintiff.' Obviously the line of decisions rejecting
the general doctrine of liability for inducing breach of contract reaches
the apodictic conclusion of denying liability for a refusal to deal, inas-
much as the latter is merely a single specific method of effecting the
general wrong of which the Gye case complains.'
In the Kentucky case of Chambers et at. v. Baldwin," the defendant
Induced breach of the plaintiff's contract for the purchase of a quantity
of tobacco with intent to injure, but also intending to obtain the bene-
fits of the sale of that particular tobacco for himself. The Court of
3See Solinger, Pre-contractual Interference by a Third Party
(1932) 6 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 322, 332.
" 'Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603 (1905); Picket v.
Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906).
IFerguson v. Kinnoull, 9 Clark & Finney 251, 321, 8 Eng. Rep. 438
(H. L. 1842).
Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okla. 223, 240, 122 Pac. 203 (1912).
"Hebbits v. Constitutional Indemnity Co. of Philadelphia, 279
Mass. 539, 181 N. E. 723 (1932); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Wallace, 162 Okla. 174, 21 Pac. (2d) 492 (1933).
1 8Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev.,
supra n. 11, at 695.
"23 Q. B. D. 598, 618-19 (1898), per Bowen, J.
Graham v. St. Charles Street Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707
(1895).
nBrown, The Right to Refuse to Sell (1916) 25 Yale L. J. 194.
S91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57 (1891).
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Appeals, denying liability, said it would not follow the majority opinion
of the Gye case, and cited the dissent of Coleridge, J., who declared that
the remedy for breach of contract is confined generally to the contract-
ing parties, and that the defendant, not being such a party, had done
no wrongful act. The actual extent of the holding would thus seem to
be limited to a denial of liability where the act done does injure but
where it is also done to further a bona fide interest from the standpollit
of the defendant. The motive of acting for one's own profit is one of
the considerations by which legal justification is determined, and one
is privileged by proper means to induce the non-performance of a con-
tract or bargain, "the purpose or effect of which is to restrict his busi-
ness opportunities in violation of a defined public policy"., A contract
of this type is one which provides for an exclusive showing of first run
films by one exhibitor in a particular locality. Other competing extqbi-
tors may be able to survive only through a breach of such a contract
by the distributor, and such a necessity may amount to a privilege.2 1
With this in mind it would seem that the Baldwin case is not authority
for the proposition that there is no liability where the quality of justi-
fication is entirely absent.
In the subsequent case ofBoulier et al. v. Macauley,2 though not in
point since it is a suit on a statute which gave remedy for procuring
the breach of laborer's contracts but was held not to apply to the serv-
ices of an actor, there is dictum supporting the Baldwin case. How-
ever the position of both these cases was taken in the face of strong
dictum in Walden v. Conn * to the effect that a stranger who drives a
tenant away from the premises by force or fraud or induces him to
leave knowing he is a tenant, thus causing the landlord an actual loss
of rents which he would not have suffered had there been no interfer-
ence with the contract, is liable to him in a special action on the case;
the court points out that the wrongful inducement of the breach brings
into use the principle that several wrongdoers are jointly or severably
liable to the injured party.
Later, in the 1917 case of H. Friedberg, Inc. v. Mcary et al. the
court took a stand which would apparently weaken the effect of the
Baldwin and Macauley cases, in spite of the fact that it attempted to
differentiate them. It held that where equitable jurisdiction was
present due to the insolvency of the defendants, the plaintiff was
entitled to injunctive relief against their attempts knowingly to caulse
the plaintiff's contract for the delivery of tobacco to be breached. The
Kentucky court rests its decision upon the Massachusetts case of
Beekman v. Martsterse which, in turn, rests upon the Gye case, thus
recognizing the latter holding by necessary implication. Even though
2Restatement, Torts (vol. IV, 1939) sec. 774.
211d. at Illustration (1).
S91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1891).
84 Ky. 312 (1886).
,173 Ky. 579, 191 S. W. 300 (1917).
Is195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (1907).
STUDENT NOTES
It must be realized that the wrong here, as such, is an equitable tort,
this case nevertheless in indicative Of the fact that the law has under-
gone a change from the position of the Baldwin case which refused to
countenance such conduct as being tortious under any possible situa-
tion, and is indicative, further, of the present trend.
With regard to refusal to deal as a specific method of inducing
breach of contract, the Kentucky case which is nearest on point is Gott
V. Berea College," in which a private educational institution of college
and high school rank virtually refused to educate its students unless
they refrained from patronizing the plaintiff's eating establishment
adjoining the campus. In the opinion, Nunn, J., observed:
"One has no right of action against a merchant for refusal to
sell goods nor will an action lie, unless such means are used as of
themselves constituted a breach of legal duty, for inducing or
causing persons not to trade, deal or contract with another; and
it is a well-established practice that, when a lawful act is performed
in the proper manner, the party performing it is not liable for mere
incidental consequences injuriously resulting from it to another."'"
But this holding is not authority for the proposition that inducement
of a breach is permissible under any conditions except methods which
are tortious per se, inasmuch as the court proceeds to point out the
legal justification of the defendant college arising from the fact that
it stood in loco parentis.3 In other words, the Berea College case has
rationalized its result by weighing the same factors considered by the
courts which do recognize Lumley v. Gye, reaching a result not incon-
gruous with the latter. Quaere: Since the holdings of the Kentucky
Court are precedent only for those situations in which there apparently
is legal justification, and since inducing breach of contract has already
been recognized as an equitable tort for which injunction will issue
where there is equitable jurisdiction by the force of the McClary case,
what possibilities are left open in the situation in which no justification
at all is present?
As to this particular problem, it is submitted that three avenues
present themselves to the judiciary of this commonwealth in the future:
(1) The court may follow the dicta in the Baldwin case and the
Berea College case so as to take the position of the dissent in the Gye
case to its fullest extent; but this would seem inexpedient in the light
of a relation between law and society demanding protection of the
plaintiff's contract rights in so far as they are reasonably due legal
protection.
(2) The court may hold with the dissent in the Gye case, admitting
- 156 Ky. 376, 161 S. W. 204 (1913).
The limitations of "proper manner" and "mere incidental con-
sequence" would certainly seem to indicate a changed attitude on the
part of the court as compared with the board, sweeping dicta of the
Baldwin and Macauley cases.
n See Restatement, Torts (vol. IV, 1939) sec. 770 where comment
(a), following the viewpoint of the Gye case, points out that the rela-
tion of In loco parentis provides legal justification or privilege.
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that the result is bad, and urging legislative action; but statutory relief
is hardly flexible enough to cope with the situation, as previous experi-,
ence has shown.
(3) The court may regard the Kentucky cases as authority only
to the true extent of their holding, following the logical implications of
the McClary case which enjoined procurement of breach, with a result-
ing approach to the view taken by the Restatement' to the effect that
inducing a breach of contract in the absence of legal justification Is an
actionable wrong.
HowARD E. TRENT, J3.
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS; REACHING THE INTEREST OF THE
BENEFICIARY FOR ALIMONY OR SUPPORT
A wife obtained a divorce with a provision for alimony and support
for three minor children. Subsequently the husband's mother created
by will a discretionary spendthrift trust in his favor and specifically
stated that the divorced wife and the children should receive no bene-
fit from the income of the trust. The husband failed to pay the sums
to the wife as directed in the decree and continued to refuse to comply
after the death of his mother at which time the spendthrift trust
became operative. The wife alleged that she and the children were in
indigent circumstances, while the husband had a substantial income
from the trust fund which was his only asset, and she sought support
from the income or principal of that trust.
The District Court dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that order in
a two to one decision. The case arose in Wisconsin and as that state
had no decisions or statutes in point the majority of the court said that
they must "determine the law of that state from the rule in other
2 See Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky. 362, 19 S. W. (2d) 989
(1929) (The statute making it unlawful to refuse further employment
to employees who did not deal at a particular store was construed as
being for the benefit of employees, and not as a protection for merchants
competing with the employer; thus a competing merchant was dented
recovery for loss of custom resulting from a violation of the statute);
Boulier et al. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60 (1921) supra n. 25,
exemplifies the strict interpretation given such a statute by the Ken-
tucky Court as it applies to inducing breach of a labor contract.
"Restatement, Torts (vol. IV, 1939) sec. 766: "Except as stated in
Section 698, one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise
purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract with
another, or (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another
is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby"; Id. at sec. 767: "In
determining whether there is a privilege to act in the manner stated
in Section 766, the following are important factors: (a) the nature of
the actor's conduct, (b) the nature of the expectancy with which his
conduct interferes, (c) the relations between the parties, (d) the
interest sought to be advanced by the actor and (e) the social interests
in protecting the expectancy on the one hand and the actors freedom of
action on the other hand."
